Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University Social Sciences Edition ›› 2025, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (6): 54-68.

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Research on the Risk Evolution Game of PPP Project Early Termination under the New Mechanism

YUAN Chen, BI Yanfeng   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China
  • Received:2024-05-30 Revised:2024-07-02 Online:2025-12-16 Published:2025-12-17

新机制下PPP项目提前终止风险演化博弈研究

袁晨,毕艳凤   

  1. 重庆交通大学 经济与管理学院,重庆 400074
  • 作者简介:袁晨,男,重庆交通大学经济与管理学院副教授,博士,硕士生导师;毕艳凤,女,重庆交通大学经济与管理学院硕士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金一般项目“西部枢纽城市通道经济网络集成效应评价及提升研究”(22BJL069)

Abstract: Considering the relevant regulations of the new PPP mechanism in China, in order to avoid early termination of PPP projects, a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, social capital, and financing institutions in the risk management process of early termination of PPP projects is constructed to analyze the stability of equilibrium points in the game system.The results indicate that: under the new PPP mechanism, the equilibrium points to avoid early termination of projects are E (strong regulation, opportunism, support) and G (strong regulation, active cooperation, support); the game can be optimized by increasing the speculative cost of social capital C4, rewarding social capital with active cooperation S, reducing the value of social capital's active cooperation cost C3, and the net profit ΔR of social capital opportunism;finally, using MATLAB simulation to analyze the dynamic evolution process, relevant countermeasures and suggestions are proposed.

Key words: new PPP mechanism, stakeholder, termination, evolutionary game

摘要: 考虑我国PPP新机制出台的相关规定,为避免PPP项目发生提前终止,构建PPP项目提前终止风险管理过程中政府、社会资本和融资机构的行为决策三方演化博弈模型,分析博弈系统中均衡点的稳定性。结果表明:在PPP新机制下为避免项目提前终止的均衡点为E(强监管,机会主义,支持)、G(强监管,积极合作,支持);可以通过增大社会资本投机成本C4、对社会资本积极合作奖励S,减小社会资本积极合作成本C3、社会资本机会主义净收益ΔR等使博弈得到优化。运用MATLAB仿真分析动态演化过程,提出相关对策与建议。

关键词: PPP新机制, 利益相关者, 提前终止, 演化博弈