Abstract: The development and promotion of energysaving and environmentally friendly new energy vehicles has become an important initiative for the worlds automobile industry， and is of strategic significance for China to cope with the deterioration of environmental quality and to reshape its future technology. The battery swapping mode has a good development prospect and many advantages， such as shorten energy supplement time and relieve mileage anxiety， how to design the policies to promote it， advancement has become a key issue. In the context of the battery swapping mode， investigating the optimal price， output， profits of the new energy vehicle manufacturer under the models of battery swapping and charging vehicle and the governments optimal decisions by developing the Stackelberg game model. The results show: 1） battery leasing and use costs， environmental benefits， etc. can affect the profits of the new energy vehicle manufacturer and the governments decisions on subsidies and taxes relief; 2） implementing the consumer subsidy and taxes relief policies can improve the profits of the new energy vehicle manufacturer， social welfare and consumer surplus; 3） when the battery swapping vehicle sales price is lower than a certain threshold value， the effect of the taxes relief policy is better than consumer subsidy policy.

Key words: battery swapping mode; new energy vehicles; pricing strategy; social welfare; Stackelberg game

摘要： 开发和推广节能环保的新能源汽车已成为世界汽车工业的一项重要举措，对中国应对环境质量恶化和重塑未来技术具有重要的战略意义。换电模式具有缩短补能时间、缓解里程焦虑等诸多优势，拥有较好的发展前景，如何设计政策推动换电模式发展已成为关键问题。在换电模式下建立Stackelberg博弈模型，分析换电车型与充电车型的最优价格、产量、新能源汽车制造商的利润和政府的最优决策。电池租赁与使用成本、环保收益等能够影响新能源汽车制造商的利润以及政府对补贴和税收减免的决策；实施补贴消费者和税收减免政策会提高新能源汽车制造商的利润、社会福利和消费者剩余；当换电车型的售价低于某一阈值时，减免税收政策的效果优于补贴政策。