›› 2017, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (3): 68-71.

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An Evolutionary Game Model Analysis of Rural Labor Force Transfer

YANG Kan1, TIAN Shuangliang1, ZHU Quanpeng2   

  1. (1.School of Mathematics and Computer Science, Northwest University for Nationalities, Lanzhou 730030, China; 2.School of Applied Engineering, Jiangxi Teachers College, Yingtan, Jiangxi 335000,China
  • Received:2016-10-11 Online:2017-06-01 Published:2017-05-29

基于演化博弈的农村劳动力迁移分析

杨侃1,田双亮1,祝荃2   

  1. 1.西北民族大学 数学与计算机科学学院,兰州 730030;2.江西师范高等专科学校 应用工程学院,江西 鹰谭 335000
  • 作者简介:杨侃(1989—),男,陕西汉中人,西北民族大学数学与计算机科学学院硕士研究生,研究方向:决策理论与分析;田双亮(1965—),男,四川安岳人,西北民族大学数学与计算机科学学院教授,硕士生导师,研究方向:系统优化与组合数学。
  • 基金资助:
    国家民委科研项目“图的MerrifieldSimmons指标与Hosoya指标的计数及排序问题研究”(14XBZ018);中央专项资金资助研究生科研创新项目“模糊需求环境下供应商与零售商合作广告的博弈分析”(Yxm2016125)

Abstract: Game theory research methods are used by building rural labor transfer decisions and the government encourage transfer dynamic evolution game model. The factors influencing the evolution of the system path are analyzed. The results show: the less the labor transfer loss, the more conducive it is to labor transfer; Urbanrural size of the relative income gap between urban labor force and rural labor force plays a major impact on the labor transfer; the larger the intangible utility and benefits, the more attractive the labor force transfer; the total costs of the government in the process of rural labor transfer and extra income difference has an important influence on its strategy taking.

Key words: rural labor force transfer, government encouragement, evolutionary game, evolutionary stable strategy

摘要: 运用博弈论的研究方法,通过构建农村劳动力迁移决策与政府鼓励迁移的动态演化博弈模型,分析影响系统演化路径的因素。研究结果表明:劳动力的迁移损失越小,越有利于劳动力迁移;劳动力城乡相对收入差距的大小对劳动力迁移有重要影响;农村劳动力迁移到城市以后获得的无形效用和福利越大,对劳动力迁移的吸引力越大;农村劳动力迁移过程中政府总成本支出与额外收益之差对其采取何种策略有重要影响。

关键词: 农村劳动力迁移, 政府鼓励, 演化博弈, 演化稳定策略