Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University Social Sciences Edition ›› 2022, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (2): 42-51.

Previous Articles     Next Articles

A Study on Subsidy Mechanism of Railway Publicwelfare Transport Based on Mixed Strategy Game Model

GUO Litian1, WANG Zhan2, LI Yue1   

  1. 1.Transportation & Economics Research Institute, China Academy of Railway Sciences Corporation Limited, 〖DW2〗Beijing 100081, China; 2.Ministry of Materials and Equipment, China State Railway Group.〖KG-*2〗, Ltd.〖KG-*2〗, Beijing 100844, China
  • Online:2022-03-22 Published:2022-04-11

基于混合策略博弈模型的 铁路公益性运输补贴机制分析

郭利田1,王占2,李悦1   

  1. 1.中国铁道科学研究院集团有限公司 运输经济研究所,北京 100081; 2.中国国家铁路集团有限公司 物资部,北京 100844
  • 作者简介:郭利田,男,中国铁道科学研究院集团有限公司副研究员,经济学博士;王占,男,中国国家铁路集团有限公司高级经济师;李悦,女,中国铁道科学研究院集团有限公司助理研究员,金融学硕士。
  • 基金资助:
    中国国家铁路集团有限公司科技研究开发计划“基于不同市场结构的铁路物资采购价格影响因素影响效率研究”(2021F014);中国铁道科学研究院集团有限公司科研项目“国铁控股合资铁路公司经营效益分类提升技术”(2019YJ082)

Abstract: Railway publicwelfare transport is an important issue which can deepen the reform and development of railway enterprises. However, there is no agreement on the definition of railway publicwelfare transport in official documents or in academic research. This paper defines the scope of railway publicwelfare transport from three aspects, namely, passenger transport, freight transport and route, then sets up a supervision game of government and railway enterprises, and designs subsidy mechanism of railway publicwelfare based on the results of Nash equilibrium analysis of mixed strategy. Finally, this paper puts forward four suggestions on establishing subsidy mechanism.

Key words: railway publicwelfare transport, operating loss, subsidy mechanism, supervision game

摘要: 铁路公益性运输是深化铁路企业改革发展需要解决的重要问题,然而无论官方文件还是学术研究中,对铁路公益性运输的界定尚未达成一致。为此,从旅客运输、货物运输、铁路线路三个方面界定铁路公益性运输的范围;构建政府与铁路企业监督博弈模型,基于混合策略纳什均衡分析结果,设计我国铁路公益性运输亏损补贴机制;提出研究建立铁路公益性运输补贴机制的设想和建议。

关键词: 铁路公益性运输, 运营亏损, 补贴机制, 博弈模型