Abstract: From the status of operational risk control and management of Chinese commercial banks, the role of some important practical factors which affect both sides of the game to maximize their utilities in the game process is analyzed，and some effective suggestions to make the supervisory side actively perform the supervisory duties are proposed and the potential responsible party to give up the strategy of fraud or dereliction of duty is urged.

Key words: operational risk, static game, equilibrium analysis

摘要： 基于中国商业银行操作风险的现状，分析各种现实因素对操作风险博弈均衡概率的影响，提出促使操作风险监督方积极履行监督责任和敦促潜在的操作风险责任方放弃选择欺诈或失职策略的有效途径。

关键词: 商业银行, 操作风险, 博弈均衡分析