›› 2020, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (4): 47-52.

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The Game Analysis of Overload Transportation and Government Supervision with the Study of the Overload Control Mechanism

CAO Changhui, LI Hao   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Jiaotong Universcity, Chongqing 400074, China
  • Received:2020-01-02 Revised:2020-02-19 Online:2020-07-20 Published:2020-07-24

超载运输与政府监管博弈分析及治理机制

曹长慧,李豪   

  1. 重庆交通大学 经济与管理学院,重庆 400074
  • 作者简介:曹长慧(1998—),女,重庆交通大学经济与管理学院学生,研究方向:交通经济等;李豪(1982—),男,重庆交通大学经济与管理学院教授,西部交通与经济社会发展研究中心副主任,博士,研究方向:交通运输经济。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目“共建共治共享背景下网约车市场治理的多方联动机制研究”(19XGL016);重庆市社会科学规划项目“重庆城市居民出行方式选择与交通拥堵治理模式”(2017YBJJ033)

Abstract: The collapse of viaduct in Wuxi, Jiangsu province in 2019 once again exposed the regulatory problem of overload. Based on the analysis of the practical difficulties of overload transportation management, this paper constructs a game model between the transportation enterprises and the supervision departments, analyzes the benefit balance and the influencing factors between the transportation enterprises and the supervision departments, and puts forward the freight sharing platform mechanism and its auxiliary measures based on the sharing mode to realize the effective management of the supervision departments, which can be used for reference for the supervision departments to manage overload significance.

Key words: overload transportation, supervision strength, overload degree, freight sharing platform

摘要: 2019年江苏无锡高架桥坍塌事件再次暴露出超载的监管问题。在分析超载运输治理现实困境基础上,构建运输企业与监管部门之间的博弈模型,分析运输企业与监管部门之间的得益均衡和影响因素,基于共享模式提出货运共享平台机制及其辅助措施,实现监管部门的有效治理,对监管部门治理超载有一定借鉴意义。

关键词: 超载运输, 监管力度, 超载程度, 货运共享平台