超载运输与监管的博弈分析

重庆交通大学学报（社会科学版） ›› 2015, Vol. 15 ›› Issue (3): 18-21.

超载运输与监管的博弈分析

周杰，李豪

重庆交通大学财经学院，重庆 400074

收稿日期:2015-03-27 修回日期:2015-04-15 出版日期:2015-06-30 发布日期:2015-06-30
作者简介:周杰（1993-），女，四川乐山人，重庆交通大学财经学院学生，研究方向：收益管理、交通运输经济等。

The Game Analysis of Overload Transportation and Regulation

ZHOU Jie, LI Hao

(College of Finance & Economics, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China)

Received:2015-03-27 Revised:2015-04-15 Online:2015-06-30 Published:2015-06-30

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 超载是我国交通运输行业面临的焦点和难点之一，长期困扰着我国运输行业的快速持续发展。构建一个三方动态博弈模型，研究国家、检查部门以及货运企业三者之间的利益分歧，得出监督概率、检查概率和超载概率的影响因素，并提出相应的治理机制，为治理超载提供强有力的理论支撑和治理机制。

关键词: 超载, 博弈分析, 机制设计

Abstract: Overloading is one of the focus and difficulties of transportation industry in China,and long plagued Chinas sustained and rapid development of the transportation industry.On the basis of the complete information static game theory,we built a threeplayers dynamic game model,discussed the interest divergence between country,prosecutors and freight transportation enterprise,obtained a result of the influencing factor of the probability of supervision,inspection and overloading.A strong theoretical support and governance mechanism for overloading are provided.

Key words: overloading, game analysis, mechanism design

周杰，李豪. 超载运输与监管的博弈分析[J]. 重庆交通大学学报（社会科学版）, 2015, 15(3): 18-21.

ZHOU Jie, LI Hao. The Game Analysis of Overload Transportation and Regulation[J]. , 2015, 15(3): 18-21.