重庆交通大学学报(社会科学版) ›› 2019, Vol. 19 ›› Issue (4): 65-71.

• 交通问题研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

社会治理创新视域下车让人政策博弈模型分析

行若竹,高凤妮   

  1. 西安建筑科技大学 马克思主义学院,西安 710055
  • 收稿日期:2018-09-16 修回日期:2018-12-01 出版日期:2019-07-20 发布日期:2019-07-04
  • 作者简介:行若竹(1994—),女,西安建筑科技大学马克思主义学院硕士研究生,研究方向:社会风险管控。

Game Model Analysis of Vehicle Avoidance Pedestrian Policy from the Perspective of Social Governance Innovation

XING Ruozhu, GAO Fengni   

  1. (Academy of Marxism, Xian University of Architecture and Technology, Xian 710055, China)
  • Received:2018-09-16 Revised:2018-12-01 Online:2019-07-20 Published:2019-07-04

摘要: 地方城市落实车辆避让行人政策以来,车主和行人两方面产生新的衍生问题。基于创新社会治理理论,在社会学层面建立车辆避让行人政策衍生问题博弈模型。博弈结果表明:社会环境和惩处力度是影响车主和行人行为的重要因素;行人处于人车博弈中的弱势地位,车主不会主动避让行人;行人行为除了受监管因素的影响,还受到自身心理活动的影响。由此,从政府部门角度出发提出车辆避让行人的创新治理路径。

关键词: 车辆避让行人, 社会治理, 信用机制

Abstract: Since the implementation of the vehicle evasion pedestrian policy in local cities, car owners and pedestrians have created new derivative problems. From the perspective of innovative social governance, a game model of vehicle avoidance pedestrian policy derivative problem is established based on sociological level. The game results show that the social environment and punishment are important factors affecting the behavior of car owners and pedestrians; pedestrians are in a weak position in the car and the game, the car owners will not actively avoid pedestrians; pedestrian behavior is affected by regulatory factors, but also by their own psychological activities Impact. Therefore, from the perspective of government departments, it is proposed to avoid the pedestrians innovative management path.

Key words: vehicles avoid pedestrians, social governance, credit mechanism